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In the aftermath of the Great Flood of 1993, the
Clinton Administration commissioned a review of floodplain
management in the United States, with an emphasis on the
Upper Mississippi.  Sharing the Challenge is the fruit of that
endeavor.  This report proposes a new vision for floodplain
management and makes numerous specific proposals--31
general recommendations and 52 action items--for
implementing that vision.  An economic analysis of these
proposals suggests some positive achievements and some
major shortcomings.
On the positive side, the report highlights some
important ideas on floodplain management that have not
received sufficient recognition, particularly among operating
agencies.  Included in those ideas are:  (1) A recognition that
we cannot eliminate the risk of catastrophic flooding and thus
that floodplain management must take into account residual
risk; (2) a recognition that states, local governments, and
private individuals and entities must bear greater
responsibility for floodplain management, including greater
fiscal responsibility; and (3) a recognition that ecological and
other natural values must be incorporated into floodplain
management, both in terms of potential for flood water
retention and for their own sakes.
On the negative side, the report is marred by fuzzy
thinking about these issues and about their implications for
policy at the Federal, state, and local levels.  The most
serious shortcomings involve failures to understand that: (1)
floodplain management involves balancing benefits and costs
and should thus not involve specific guarantees of safety; (2)
environmental concerns are best addressed by including
monetary estimates of resource values into benefit-cost
analyses; (3) planning is likely to be counterproductive when
the incentive structure created by current Federal policies
promotes excessive floodplain development; and (4) reasons
for Federal involvement in floodplain management are not
necessarily reasons for Federal subsidization.
Economically Efficient Flood Risk Management
The goal of floodplain management should be to find
the appropriate balance between competing alternative uses
of floodplain/river systems.  Flood plain management
involves both land and water resources that have multiple
competing uses, including navigation, recreation, commercial
fishing, drinking water, wildlife habitat, waste disposal,
industry, commerce, human habitation, agriculture, and
wildlife habitat.  These uses generally compete at the margin,
in the sense that increasing the level of one type of use (e.g.,
wildlife habitat) means decreasing the level of another (e.g.,
agriculture).  Thus, both land and water resources are scarce
relative to desired human uses, that is, they are economic
goods.
Scarce resources like these should be allocated in a
way that gives maximum satisfaction of human wants given
the scarcity of the resources available to satisfy those wants.
This means choosing a set of multiple uses--including
environmental as well as commercial or other human
activities--to maximize the net benefits of floodplain use, i.e.,
total benefits of the services provided by all multiple uses
minus the total costs of providing those services.  Such a
maximum is achieved when the additional social benefit
provided by the last unit of each type of service or use equals
the additional social cost of providing that last unit.
Human behavior is a critically important factor in
floodplain management. The probability of flooding and the
potential social and economic damage from flooding depend
on land use decisions and thus on economic and institutional
factors such as government policies.  The phenomenon of
moral hazard is of particular importance in this regard.  An
example of moral hazard is when levee construction induces
greater floodplain development, which increases damage in
the event of flooding and thus at least partially counteracts
the decrease in the likelihood of flooding due to the levee.
The fact that flood damage continues to rise over time despite
increased investment in flood control structures (Federal
Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force, chapter 3)
suggests that this sort of moral hazard is a significant
problem in floodplain management, and thus must be taken
into account in determining the appropriate balance among
competing uses of floodplain/river systems.  The fact that
there are presently 10 million homes in the 100-year flood
plain and cases like Chesterfield, Missouri, where an
industrial park was sited behind an agricultural levee only to
suffer extensive damage during the Great Flood, are
frequently cited in this regard (see for example Faber and
Hunt).
Several implications about floodplain management
follow from this general economic perspective.  First,
Sharing the Challenge is right in pointing out that absolute
safety neither can nor should be guaranteed, but is inaccurate
in calling for “reduc[ing] the vulnerability of the nation to the
dangers and damages that result from floods.”  Reducing
expected flood damage should not be a goal of flood plain
management per se; rather, the appropriate level of
protection from flooding should equate the marginal social
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benefits of expected damage reduction with its marginal
social cost.  High expected flood damage may well be
appropriate if the expected benefits of an activity are large
enough to outweigh expected damage, but not large enough
to justify further investment in protection.  Eliminating the
risk of flooding and/or flood damage is generally not
desirable because the marginal cost of providing complete
protection from flooding typically exceeds the marginal
benefits.  For example, the risk of flood damage can be
eliminated completely by simply restricting any human use
of flood-prone areas, but this hardly seems reasonable:
Economic activity in floodplains is valuable enough that the
social costs of such a policy (the value of foregone uses of the
floodplain) will generally far exceed the social benefits of
reduced flood damages incurred over time.
Second, over time, some flood losses are certain to
occur, even under an optimal policy.  Moreover, it is not
likely that an optimal flood management policy would permit
rare but severe flooding (because of the high marginal costs
and low expected (i.e., average annual) benefits of containing
rare, extremely high flood stages), so that this year's massive
flooding along the Mississippi does not demonstrate in and
of itself that the current level of flood protection is
insufficient.  To its credit, Sharing the Challenge explicitly
recognizes that the experiences of the Great Flood of 1993
demonstrate how well the current flood protection system
works.  The damage estimates provided by the report suggest
that the expected losses from events like the Great Flood are
probably not large enough to warrant greater protection:
Deducting losses occurring outside the floodplain and losses
due to disrupted barge traffic from the report*s total of $12
billion, putting crop losses on an income basis using a
(generous) rate of return of 15 percent, assuming an average
value of $1000 per acre for the 60,000 acres of farm land
rendered unusable, and using a frequency of return of 0.2
percent gives expected annual damage on the order of only
$8 to $10 million.
Third, the concept of the Standard Project Flood
(SPF) should have little or no place in floodplain
management.  Instead, the level of protection for every
location should equate marginal social benefit with marginal
social cost, including external costs of protection in terms of
increased flood risk and/or damage in the event of flooding
elsewhere in the floodplain.  However, Sharing the Challenge
recommends protecting “population centers” and “critical
infrastructure” from SPF discharges, where SPF is defined as
the 0.2-percent annual chance flood (p. 70).  Use of an SPF
criterion can be especially harmful because of moral hazard
effects:  Those protected by levees built to an SPF standard
will assume that they are subject only to a negligible residual
flood risk, and will develop land behind those levees
accordingly, increasing damage in those rare events of
greater-than-SPF magnitude.  Moreover, establishing a
criterion like SPF-level protection for “population centers” is
an open invitation for developers to recreate the Chesterfield
situation by creating “facts on the ground”, then demanding
greater levels of protection.
Preserving and Enhancing the Natural Resources and
Functions of Floodplains
Many of the services provided by land and water
resources are economic goods, even if they are not explicitly
bought and sold like other commodities.  Recreation
(swimming, boating, fishing, scenic amenities, wildlife
habitat), water quality improvements provided by wetlands,
flood water retention from natural areas, and other
environmental services have value because they are scarce
relative to desired human uses.  The existence of certain
species or types of habitat may similarly have value because
of their scarcity relative to the 
levels desired.
Economically efficient floodplain management must
take the costs and benefits of these natural goods and services
into account in a more thorough and comprehensive way than
has been the case to date.  To its credit, Sharing the
Challenge recognizes the importance of doing so and makes
a number of recommendations aimed at making
environmental considerations more central to floodplain
management.  These include: establishing environmental
quality as a co-equal objective with national economic
development; giving greater consideration to nonstructural
flood protection measures, including restoration of natural
wetlands, flood water retention areas, and floodways; giving
the Interior Department a greater role in floodplain
management decisions; and ensuring greater coordination
and commonality of guidelines for habitat and wetlands
restoration buyouts during the aftermath of floods, when
buyouts are more politically and fiscally feasible.
Operationally, Sharing the Challenge proposes to
make environmental concerns central to floodplain
management decision making by replacing the current
Principles and Guidelines (P&G) used by the Army Corps of
Engineers for project evaluation with a system of accounts
that would report (1) national economic development
(national income), (2) regional economic development, (3)
other social effects, and (4) environmental quality.
This proposal is problematic because it puts measures
pertaining to the efficient use of resources, or national
income broadly defined, on a par with measures pertaining to
the distribution of resources, that is, it confuses efficiency and
equity.  Environmental quality is a component of national
income (or national economic development, in the Army
Corps* terminology), and improvements in environmental
quality are thus increases in national income.  But promoting
regional economic development or  boosting local
employment does not increase national income; rather,
Federal investment in one region comes at the expense of
other regions, so that regional development generally
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involves only the distribution of income.  The system-of-
accounts proposal is especially worrisome because it could be
used to justify economically inefficient projects on the
grounds of regional economic development or other effects.
Doing so could ultimately have negative effects on
environmental quality by broadening the range of acceptable
Corps projects.
A straightforward alternative is to incorporate
monetary estimates of the values of environmental services
into benefit-cost analyses of floodplain management options.
Doing so is certainly feasible:  There has been tremendous
progress in the development of methods for valuing these
goods and services monetarily, both in cases where they
affect market transactions and in cases where they do not.
The value of reductions in flood risk due to flood water
retention can be estimated from reductions in the cost of
protection downstream, the value of improved water quality
of wetlands from the reduction in water treatment costs or
improved recreational opportunities.  The value of improved
recreational opportunities can be estimated from market
transactions using revealed preference methods such as
travel-cost models, hedonic property value models, and other
methods for deriving environmental values implicit in
observed market transactions.  The values of environmental
amenities can be estimated from contingent valuation
methods, which, despite some controversies over finer
methodological points, are widely recognized.  (see for
example Arrow et al.).
Organizing Floodplain Management for Success?
The main message of Sharing the Challenge is that
the best way to improve floodplain management is through
more comprehensive and better-coordinated planning. 
The report calls for the creation of a set of
interlocking institutions at the Federal, state and local levels
to coordinate and systematize planning processes.  The Water
Resources Council would be reactivated to ensure greater
cooperation among Federal agencies in floodplain planning.
Greater participation by states in floodplain planning would
be accomplished through: a Floodplain Management Act that
would define responsibilities at different levels of
government, strengthen Federal-state coordination, and
assure accountability; Federal-state River Basin Commissions
(RBCs), which would provide opportunities for discussion
and coordination; and the establishment of an Upper
Mississippi Rivers and Tributaries (UMR&T) Project, which
would institutionalize a planning and management capability
for the Upper Mississippi within the Army Engineers.
This view is at best naive.  The most comprehensive,
best-coordinated, soundest, most objective planning can
accomplish very little if the incentives created by economic
institutions like markets and government programs induce
homeowners, businesses, and governmental bodies to act in
ways contrary to the social good.  And the incentives
operating in floodplains are strikingly perverse, largely
because Federal post-disaster assistance creates powerful
incentives for excessive floodplain development by ensuring
that those investing in floodplain development never bear the
full cost of their actions. .  Homeowners struck by
catastrophic flooding are eligible for grants and for Small
Business Administration (SBA) loans at below-market
interest rates to rebuild their homes or pay off their
mortgages.  Businesses--frequently even those of substantial
size--also typically receive subsidized SBA loans.  Until the
reform of crop insurance passed by Congress earlier this year,
farmers were compensated for the value of crop losses; even
after reform, crop insurance remains heavily subsidized.
Local governments get Federal public assistance grants to
rebuild damaged public buildings and infrastructure.  As a
result, individuals and businesses never bear the full cost of
locating in floodplains, while local governments--which have
authority over land use, building codes, and other essentials
of floodplain management--need never be accountable either
for succumbing to pressure from local real estate interests by
permitting floodplain development or for locating public
buildings or infrastructure in high flood-hazard areas.
The moral hazard problem is compounded by the fact
that the Federal government subsidizes a large share of the
costs of structural flood protection (e.g., levee construction)
undertaken under the auspices of the Army Corps of
Engineers and of the Soil Conservation Service. Cost-sharing
of levees creates a bias favoring structural flood protection
measures and, as a consequence, may help promote excessive
development of floodplains, most likely with negative effects
on environmental quality. 
Under these circumstances, the action program
proposed by Sharing the Challenge is more likely to make
matters worse than better.  Giving state and local
governments a larger voice in the planning process without
a corresponding financial stake is an open invitation to
demand more Federal largesse.  The RBCs and the UMR&T
Project provide organizational structures and resources that
can be used to justify and lobby for greater development of
floodplains and/or greater Federal investment in additional
protective measures.  The UMR&T Project provides a
structure that can be used to capture funding for greater
Federal investment in flood protection, i.e., a conduit for
pork-barrel spending.
Sharing the Challenge at least partially recognizes
the problematic role of Federal post-disaster aid, and
proposes some reforms aimed at curbing the worst excesses,
such as capping Federal cost-sharing at the current statutory
minimum of 75 percent, and giving local governments loans
for infrastructure upgrade, removing the temptation to use
post-disaster aid for this purpose.  But these actions are
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nowhere near thoroughgoing enough to remove the perverse
incentives created by Federal assistance and mitigate the
moral hazard problem to any significant extent.  A more
effective approach would be to (1) eliminate grants to local
governments for public buildings and infrastructure damaged
in catastrophes, replacing them with loans at interest rates at
least equal to the Federal cost of funds, (2) provide loans to
homeowners and businesses at the market rate of interest,
and (3) limit the provision of Federal grants to individuals
only to the very poor.
Using Flood Insurance to Internalize the Costs of
Floodplain Development
Greater reliance on insurance would also help limit
moral hazard problems by forcing individuals, businesses,
and local governments to face up to the costs of locating in
floodplains.  Sharing the Challenge recognizes this and
identifies as a major problem the fact that that most
homeowners with property in the 100-year floodplain do not
purchase flood insurance, even though they are legally
required to do so, while many businesses and local
governments remain uninsured as well.  The report
recommends a number of actions aimed at remedying this
state of affairs, including having states encourage flood
insurance purchases; improving lender compliance through
pending legislation; permitting escrow of flood insurance
premiums; developing improved marketing techniques;
reducing the amounts of post-disaster aid available for those
failing to purchase insurance; and requiring actuarially-based
flood insurance for properties behind levees providing less-
than-SPF-level protection.
But the report fails to underscore fully enough the
fact that Federal post-disaster aid creates enormous
disincentives against purchasing insurance because it
essentially provides insurance for free.  Limiting post-disaster
aid to market-rate loans would make insurance far more
attractive financially, and is thus likely to be far more
effective in promoting insurance purchases than any amount
of improved marketing.  The report also fails to recognize
that Federal post-disaster aid removes any incentives for
lenders to enforce the flood-insurance-purchase requirement.
Subsidized SBA loans effectively provide lenders with
mortgage insurance, making flood insurance redundant from
the lender*s point of view.  Making those without flood
insurance ineligible for SBA loans would give lenders an
incentive to enforce the purchase requirement, and is likely
to be both cheaper and more effective than attempting to
accomplish the same end through more strenuous
enforcement, as suggested by the report.
It has long been believed that homeowners fail to
purchase insurance against catastrophic risks like flooding
because they underestimate their likelihood (see for example
Kunreuther and White).  But experience of floods is more
common than the recurrence interval might suggest at first
glance, indicating that faulty perceptions of risk may be less
of a problem than commonly thought.  The probability that
at least one flood of 0.2-percent-recurrence magnitude will
occur at a given site during the 30-year lifetime of a
mortgage, for example, is over 6 percent, while the
probability that such a flood will occur over a 50-year period
is almost 10 percent.  Moreover, as long as flood events in
nearby areas are less-than-perfectly correlated, the probability
that a flood of such magnitude will occur somewhere nearby
is even higher.  In fact, there have been numerous floods of
1-percent-recurrence magnitude or higher along the Upper
Mississippi over the past 50 years.  One suspects that the
inhabitants of the Upper Mississippi floodplain experience
flooding with as much frequency as most people experience
fires, which are commonly insured against.
What Role for the Federal Government?
Finally, there is a broader, more fundamental
question that Sharing the Challenge completely fails to
address--that of federalism, that is, what roles the Federal,
state, and local governments should play.  The current
situation has some unusual features.  Floodplain management
is a form of land use control, a function of government that,
in the United States, is under the jurisdiction of local
authorities, with some oversight at the state level; the Federal
government plays a role in land use planning only in a
restricted set of cases where some broader national interest is
at stake, for instance, interstate transportation or, more
recently, environmental concerns of national scope (beach
erosion, wetlands conversion).  The fact that floodplain
management involves the Federal government directly with
local authorities is also unusual, since Federal involvement
is typically mediated through state agencies.
Is there a compelling set of national interests that
justifies Federal involvement in floodplain management?  Or,
in economic terms, are there failures of private markets that
necessitate Federal intervention to achieve economic
efficiency?  There are some obvious ones.  Flood protection
measures at different sites along the Mississippi are
interdependent:  Flood control and drainage structures at any
one site increase the volume and speed of flows on the
opposite shore, at sites downstream, possibly at sites
upstream, and thus affect the likelihood and severity of
flooding.  Coordination across the river basin is needed to
ensure that these external effects are taken into account in
flood protection investment decisions.  Federal involvement
helps ensure that all states participate in such coordination.
Navigation also raises important issues of interstate
commerce, in which the Federal government has long
maintained a vital interest.  Protection of ecosystems and
species of national importance further justifies Federal
involvement.
But a need for Federal help in coordinating flood
protection and navigation does not imply a corresponding
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need for Federal subsidization of these activities, nor does it
imply a need for Federal disaster relief.  The prospect of
moral hazard indicates precisely the contrary: those choosing
to locate in floodplains should bear the full cost of their
decisions, either by purchasing insurance at actuarially fair
rates, or by suffering losses in the event of flooding, so that
all development in floodplains can pass a benefit-cost test.
One can argue that capital market imperfections
justify a Federal presence:  Municipalities and local levee
distr icts may find it difficult to raise funding for justifiable
investments in flood protection, for example, while
individuals and businesses may find it difficult to raise
money for rebuilding, even if they self-insure adequately.
But problems of capital availability do not imply a need for
subsidies:  They can be addressed quite adequately by a
Federal lending program offering funding at nonsubsidized
interest rates.
Alternatively, lack of availability of insurance might
be used to motivate a Federal presence.  Catastrophic flood
risks are not as insurable as fire, for instance; loss provisions
cannot be estimated using actuarial methods, and risks must
be pooled across time, making it difficult for regulators to
determine appropriate premiums.  Again, lack of availability
may justify Federal involvement, but not subsidization.
Affordability problems may justify subsidization:  Many of
those living in floodplains are poor, and cannot afford
insurance.  If it is believed to be in the social interest to
transfer income from the general taxpaying public to the poor
living in floodplains, then some subsidization could be
warranted; but not subsidization of those with high enough
incomes to afford insurance and thus bear the full cost of
their locational choices.  A disaster relief program designed
with affordability in mind would thus feature means-testing
of benefits, something current Federal policy does not do.
Moreover, one needs to question the wisdom of helping the
poor remain in harm*s way, rather than encouraging them to
move to safer ground.
Sharing the Challenge does not grapple with these
fundamental issues.  The report could have provided a
clearer, more compelling vision of floodplain management of
the future had it faced them squarely.  Instead, it simply took
the existing Federal-state-local division of responsibilities as
a given and, as a result, produced a set of recommendations
that effectively sidestep arguably the most important
challenges of floodplain management as the 21st century
approaches.
References
Kenneth Arrow, Robert Solow, Paul Portney, Edward
Leamer, Roy Radner, and Howard Schuman, 1993.  Report
of the NOAA Panel on Contingent Valuation.  Washington,
DC, January 11, 1993.
Scott Faber and Constance Hunt, 1994. “River Management
Post-1993: The Choice is Ours”, Water Resources Update 95
(Spring 1994).
Interagency Floodplain Management Review Committee,
1994. Sharing the Challenge: Floodplain Management into
the 21st Century, Washington, DC, June 1994.
Howard C. Kunreuther and Gilbert F. White, 1994. “The
Role of the National Flood Insurance Program in Reducing
Losses and Promoting Wise Use of Floodplains” Water
Resources Update 95 (Spring 1994).
National Interagency Floodplain Management Task Force,
Floodplain Management in the United States: An Assessment
Report.  Volume 2, Full Report.  Washington, DC, June
1992.
____________
Erik Lichtenberg is Associate Professor of Agricultural and
Resource Economics at the University of Maryland at
College Park.  He was Senior Economist for Agriculture,
Natural Resources, and International Trade on the staff of
the President*s Council of Economic Advisers during the
writing of Sharing the Challenge, and served as the chair of
the FMRC*s Economics Advisory Group.  The ideas
expressed here are his alone, and should not be attributed to
the Council of Economic Advisers or any other agency of the
Federal government.
